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COMMENTS
MATIMAK TRADING CO. V. KIJALILY: THE
FRAMERS DISHONORED
INTRODUCTION
"[T]he peace of the WHOLE ought not to be left at the disposal
of a PART."' In The Federalist Number 80, Alexander Hamilton
listed the various contexts into which the authority of the federal
judiciary extends.2 Despite its position at the end of Hamilton's
list, history reveals the Framers' true appreciation for the impor-
tance of settling cases "between a State, or the Citizens thereof,
and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects" 'within the federal judi-
cial forum.4 In today's global economy, this particular intention
1 THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (explaining that one of the purposes for a national judiciary was to ensure that
matters of national concern, such as foreign relations, were not left to the discretion
of state courts).
2 See id. at 475.
It seems scarcely to admit of controversy that the judiciary authority of the
Union ought to extend to these several descriptions of cases: 1st, to all
those which arise out of the laws of the United States, passed in pursuance
of their just and constitutional powers of legislation; 2nd, to all those which
concern the execution of the provisions expressly contained in the articles
of Union; 3rd, to all those in which the United States are a party;, 4th, to all
those which involve the PEACE of the CONFEDERACY, whether they relate to
the intercourse between the United States and foreign nations or to that
between the States themselves; 5th, to all those which originate on the high
seas, and are of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction; and lastly, to all those
in which the State tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial and unbi-
ased.
Id.
3 U.S. CONST. art. ]M, § 2, cl. 1.
4 See Wythe Holt, The Origins of Alienage Jurisdiction, 14 OKLA. CITY U. L.
REV. 547, 548-561 (1989) (tracing the history of alienage jurisdiction). The delegates
at the Constitutional Convention in 1787 unanimously agreed that the Constitution
should provide for a national judiciary that would, in the words of the preamble to
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of the Framers' has taken on an added significance. To encour-
age continued foreign investment and interaction with United
States business enterprises, the right of access to the impartial
federal judiciary, provided by alienage jurisdiction, must be up-
held. However, a recent decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit, Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily,5
threatens to eliminate the availability of the federal forum in cir-
cumstances for which alienage jurisdiction was created.
In Matimak, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals examined
whether a corporation could invoke alienage jurisdiction as a
"citizen or subject" of Hong Kong.' Matimak filed suit in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York in August of 1996 after two New York corporations, Unitex
Mills, Inc. and D.A.Y. Sportswear Inc., allegedly breached a con-
tractual arrangement with the Matimak Trading Co., a corpora-
tion established under Hong Kong law with its principal place of
business in Hong Kong.7 Matimak based its claim of federal ju-
risdiction on diversity between "citizens of a State and citizens or
subjects of a foreign state."8 The district court raised the jurisdic-
tional issue sua sponte, and concluded that Hong Kong was not a
the Constitution, "establish justice," not merely improve it. See id. at 548-49. As
James Madison, the father of the Constitution noted, "[cionfidence can[not] be put in
the State Tribunals as guardians of the National authority and interests" because
partiality in state courts prevents the effective administration of laws where for-
eigners are a party. See id. at 549 (quoting THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 27 (M. Farrand ed., 1937)). The need for national courts to
have jurisdiction over suits to which aliens are a party was reflected in four of the
five national judiciary proposals presented at the Constitutional Convention. See id.
at 550-51. Convention delegates were especially concerned with the state courts'
unwillingness to recognize ratified treaties, especially the Treaty of Peace with
Great Britain. See id. at 552. Many citizens had no desire to repay debts owed to
British citizens, necessitating a national court system to ensure repayment of debts
owed to foreigners. See id. at 562; see also Kevin R. Johnson, Why Alienage Jurisdic-
tion? Historical Foundations and Modem Justifications for Federal Jurisdiction
Over Disputes Involving Noncitizens, 21 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 6-10 (1996) (emphasizing
economics as a cause of anti-British sentiment in the newly formed United States
and noting the Framers' recognition of the importance of the courts in assuring equi-
table resolutions of foreign relations matters).
5 118 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 883 (1998).
6 See id. at 78.7 See id.
8 Id. Matimak brought the breach of contract claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a)(2)
which provides in pertinent part: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between... citizens of a State and
citizens or subjects of a foreign state." 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a)(2) (1998).
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"foreign state" under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a)(2), precluding it from
recognizing Matimak as a "citizen or subject" of a "foreign state,"
and ultimately dismissed Matimak's complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.9 Subsequently, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the holding of the district
court and refused to recognize Hong Kong as a "foreign state" for
purposes of diversity jurisdiction."0
First, the court evaluated formal recognition of Hong Kong
as a "foreign state" by the United States as a potential basis for
alienage jurisdiction in the case of Matimak." Noting the ab-
sence of a definition of "foreign state" in either the United States
Constitution or 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a)(2), the court stated the gen-
eral rule that "a foreign state is one formally recognized by the
executive branch of the United States government." 2 Upon
agreement of the involved parties that the United States had not
formally recognized Hong Kong as a foreign state, the court pro-
ceeded to examine Matimak's contention that Hong Kong had re-
ceived "de facto" recognition as a foreign state, thereby allowing
9 See Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, 936 F. Supp. 151, 152-153 (S.D.N.Y.
1996), affd, 118 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 883 (1998). After
raising the issue of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, the court asked the par-
ties to file briefs supporting their positions. See id. at 152. Matimak argued that
Hong Kong should be recognized as a de facto foreign state based on policy consid-
erations. See id. (citing Iran Handicraft & Carpet Export Ctr. v. Maijan Int'l Corp.,
655 F. Supp. 1275, 1277 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)). The court rejected this reasoning and de-
clared that recognition of foreign states is a function of the executive, not the judi-
cial, branch of government. See id. at 152. Relying upon the Second Circuit's decision
in Murarka v. Bachrack Bros., Inc., 215 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1954), which recognized
India as a foreign state for diversity purposes, Matimak further asserted that Hong
Kong should be recognized as a de facto foreign state for diversity purposes. See id.
at 152-53. Stressing the following distinctions between the two situations, the court
disagreed. See id. In anticipation of India's political separation from Great Britain,
four days before the Indian Independence Act took effect and before the complaint in
the Murarka case had been filed, an Interim Indian Government had been estab-
lished and the United States and the newly independent Indian nation had ex-
changed ambassadors. See id. at 152. Yet, Matimak filed its complaint more than a
year and a half before the reversion to Chinese sovereignty, and at that point, the
United States had not yet begun the process of formally recognizing Hong Kong as a
fully incorporated part of China. See id. at 152-53.
oSee Matimak, 118 F.3d at 78.
"See id. at 79-83.
'2 Id. at 79. See also Iran Handicraft & Carpet Export Ctr. v. Marjan Intl Corp.,
655 F. Supp. 1275, 1277 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), affd, 868 F.2d 1267 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing
13B CHARLES ALAN WRiGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3604, at
391 (1984).
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its citizens to invoke alienage jurisdiction.13 The court stated its
intention to defer to the executive branch's recognition of foreign
states for the purpose of alienage jurisdiction." Citing the objec-
tives of alienage jurisdiction15 and the jurisprudential paradigm
for defining a "foreign state"" as "compelling reasons" for its ad-
herence to any executive decision on a foreign state," the court
repudiated Matimak's arguments in support of de facto recogni-
tion and rejected its claim of alienage jurisdiction. 8 In his dis-
senting opinion, Circuit Judge Altimari expressed his concern
that the majority's holding could likely lead "to the very political
entanglements the Constitution and § 1332 sought to avoid." 9
'3 See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 80. The Second Circuit noted that in finding de facto
recognition as a foreign state, the most important criteria is whether the entity is
regarded as an "independent sovereign nation." Id.
See id at 81-83.
'5 See id. at 82-83. The court stated two objectives of alienage jurisdiction. The
first, to avoid conflicts with foreign nations which might arise if their citizens were
treated unfairly. See id. The second, to place these cases within the jurisdiction of
federal courts to avoid unfair treatment of foreigners which is more likely to occur in
the state court system. See id. at 83.
'6 See id. at 83-84; see also National Petrochemical Co. of Iran v. M/T Stolt
Sheaf, 860 F.2d 551, 553 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing Pfizer Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308, 319-
320 (1978), where the Court ruled that for purposes of diversity jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4), a foreign state and the government that represents it must be
one "recognized" by the United States.). The court stated that the similar rationales
behind § 1332(a)(2) and § 1332(a)(4) should mandate uniformity in defining "foreign
states." See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 84. However, "foreign state" under 28 U.S.C. §
1332(a)(4) is defined by reference to 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a), while no such reference ex-
ists under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). See id. at 83. This difference creates a slight but
perceptible distinction in the definition of "foreign state." See id. at 84 n.3.
17 See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 82.
18 See id. at 88. The court explained that it had established the doctrine of de
facto recognition in Murarka, where, despite the absence of formal de jure recogni-
tion of India as a foreign state, certain prior acts by the United States amounted to
de facto recognition. See id. at 80; see also supra note 9 and accompanying text. "At
the very least,... the de facto test depends heavily on whether the Executive
Branch regards the entity as an 'independent, sovereign nation.' " Matimak, 118
F.3d at 80 (quoting Iran Handicraft & Carpet Export Ctr., 655 F. Supp. at 1278); see
also Calderone v. Naviera Vacuba S/A, 325 F.2d 76, 77 (2d Cir. 1963), modified on
other grounds, 328 F.2d 578 (2d Cir. 1964) (per curiam) (upholding alienage jurisdic-
tion in a suit between a Cuban corporation and an American company). In Cal-
derone, the court noted:
Considerations of both international relations and judicial administration
lead us to conclude that the onus is on the Department of State, or some
other department of the Executive Branch, to bring to the attention of the
courts its decision that permitting nationalized Cuban corporations to sue
is contrary to the national interest.
Calderone, 325 F.2d at 77.
'9 Matimak, 118 F.3d at 92.
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On January 26, 1998, the Supreme Court denied certiorari and
allowed the Second Circuit's denial of jurisdiction to stand."
It is proposed that the Matimak Court erred in denying al-
ienage jurisdiction. The goal of the Framers was to avert in-
volvement in needless foreign relation debacles by providing for-
eign litigants with access to the most neutral forum available in
a time of extreme patriotism and xenophobia in the United
States.2' By relegating the claim of the Matimak Trading Co. to
state court, the Matimak court contravened the intentions of the
Framers and risked antagonizing an important member of the
international community. Additionally, it is offered that the
court failed to sufficiently evaluate the consequences of continued
judicial deference. The ramifications of this decision will likely
be a loss of foreign investment and increased aggrandizement of
the legislative and executive branches of government at the ex-
pense of the relatively feeble judiciary.
This Comment contends that the historical purposes of al-
ienage jurisdiction and the severity of declaring any entity
"stateless" counsel in favor of providing the Matimak Trading Co.
with the option of pursuing its claim in federal court. Also, the
dangers inherent in judicial deference to the executive, in this
context and others, signal the need for a reevaluation of its costs
and benefits. Lastly, maintenance of the constitutionally-
designed fragile equilibrium between the respective branches of
government requires that each branch safeguard its responsibili-
ties and powers from encroachment by the others.
I. THE PURPOSES OF ALIENAGE JURISDICTION REVISITED
Interestingly, the majority and the dissent in Matimak both
refer to the Framers' motivations for creating alienage jurisdic-
tion as justifications for their opposing viewpoints.' Of para-
mount importance to the Framers was assuring the newly formed
nation access to capital necessary for it to succeed.' Atrocities
20 See Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, 118 S.Ct. 883 (1998).
21 See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 82-83.
22See id. at 86-92.
See Wythe Holt, "To Establish Justice": Politics, The Judiciary Act of 1789,
and the Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1452 (1989). "National
union, national honor, and more importantly national credit depended upon the 'es-
tablish[ment of] justice' in forums freed from popular pressures, in which solemn
treaty obligations could be safely enforced." Id.
1998] 611
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committed by the British during the war fanned an anti-British
fire already raging in the colonies.24 Colonial resentment and
contempt fostered defiance of treaties and lax judicial enforce-
ment of debts owed to British business persons.' The Framers,
aware of the potential for treaty violations after the long and
bloody war, wisely included in the Supremacy Clause the re-
quirement that all state courts abide by all treaties in existence
at the time and those ratified in the future.2 1 Similarly, cogni-
zant of state court failures to ensure repayment of colonial obli-
gations to British subjects, alienage jurisdiction granted the right
to preside over suits between a United States citizen and a for-
eigner to the seemingly more impartial federal courts.2'  The
Framers' objectives were centered on the "[tiwo interrelated con-
cerns" of providing an alternative to the biased state courts un-
fairly deciding matters involving foreigners, and preventing un-
necessary entanglements with foreign nations.' The interesting
aspect of the majority and dissent similarly relying upon the
aims of alienage jurisdiction to justify their opinions is that one
24 In James Madison's words:
No description can give you an adequate idea of the barbarity with which
the Enemy have conducted the war in the Southern States. Every outrage
which humanity could suffer has been committed by them. Desolation
rather than conquest seems to have been their object. They have acted
more like desperate bands of Robbers or Buccaneers than like a nation
making war for dominion.... Rapes, murders [and] the whole catalogue of
individual cruelties, not protection [and] the distribution of justice are the
acts which characterize the sp[h]ere of their usurped Jurisdiction.
3 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 180 (1963) (letter from James Madison to Philip
Mazzei dated July 7, 1781); see also Johnson, supra note 4, at 7 n.26 (describing
violence against loyalists in New York).
25 See Holt, supra note 4, at 553-62 (describing colonial disregard for the Treaty
of Peace with Great Britain and the failure of the state courts to require repayment
of debts owed to British citizens); see also Blair Holdings Corp. v. Rubinstein, 133 F.
Supp. 496, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (stating that one of the purposes of alienage jurisdic-
tion is to provide protection for foreigners through enforceable treaties).
26 See Holt, supra note 4, at 552; see also 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787 417 (M. Farrand ed., 1937) (recounting a motion of James
Madison to reconsider the Supremacy Clause which caused, without dissent, the ad-
dition of the words "or which shall be made," after the words "all treaties made").
27 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1
28 Christine Biancheria, Restoring the Right to Have Rights: Statelessness and
Alienage Jurisdiction in Light of Abu-Zeineh v. Federal Lab., Inc., 11 AM. U. J. INTL
L. & POLY 195, 206-07 (1996); see also Blair Holdings Corp., 133 F. Supp. at 500
(explaining the concerns alienage jurisdiction sought to address); Holt, supra note 4,
at 1458 (noting that a solution to the problem of recovering debts and compelling
strict compliance with contracts was to establish federal courts, with judges less sus-
ceptible to the pressures exerted by local debtors).
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argument must be more accurate than the other, as it seems im-
possible for the aims of alienage jurisdiction to precisely support
diametrically opposed results in exactly the same measure.
The Framers' appraisal of alienage jurisdiction more than
two hundred years ago, as a meaningful device to quell foreign
concerns over bias against foreigners in state courts, is just as
accurate today. Consequently, hindering free access to the fed-
eral judiciary in cases over which it has jurisdiction must betray
the intentions of the Framers. While the Framers were con-
cerned with maltreatment of British economic concerns, present
day domestic malaise over foreign commerce adversely affecting
the United States is more varied.29 Yet, similar to the situation
that existed in the end of the eighteenth century, "[c]oncern with
foreign business frequently has been strongest at the state and
local levels."" These factors, coupled with the present economic
relations between Hong Kong and the United States,31 militate in
favor of honoring the purposes behind alienage jurisdiction and
2 See Johnson, supra note 4, at 44-45 (discussing anxiety over foreign influence
in the United States economy). See generally, NORMAN J. GLICKMAN & DOUGLAS P.
WOODWARD, THE NEW COMPETITORS: How FOREIGN INvESTORS ARE CHANGING THE
U.S. ECONOMY (1989) (analyzing the impact of foreign investment on the U.S. econ-
omy); HENRY J. STEINER, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 51-53, 63-66 (4th ed.
1994) (describing state and federal control of economic activities of aliens);.
30 See Johnson, supra note 4, at 45, 45 n.254; see also Mark Shapiro, Note, The
Dormant Commerce Clause: A Limit on Alien Land Laws, 20 BROOK. J. INTL L. 217,
223-24 (1993) (discussing state-imposed limitations on alien land ownership).
31 See Tetra Finance (HK) Ltd. v. Shaheen, 584 F. Supp. 847, 848 (S.D.N.Y.
1984) (noting that the United States is Hong Kong's largest foreign investor and
trading partner); see also Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, 118 F.3d 76, 90 (2d Cir.)
(Altimari, J., dissenting) (illustrating how the United States considers Hong Kong
essentially a foreign state for other purposes), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 883 (1998).
Judge Altimari, in his dissent, noted Hong Kong's recognition as a separate foreign
state under Section 202 of the Immigration and Naturalization Act for purposes of
per-country numerical limitations. See id. In addition Judge Altimari stated the fol-
lowing-
Hong Kong is [ I recognized as an autonomous entity in the economic and
trade arena; a contracting party to the General Agreement of Tariffs and
Trade, and thereby accorded most favored nation status by the United
States; considered a member country in the United States Information
Agency educational exchange program; and a member of the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development. Hong Kong is a founding
member of the World Trade Organization ....
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also The Hong Kong Policy Act, 22
U.S.C. § 5701(1)(E)(4) (1994) ("Hong Kong plays an important role in today's re-
gional and world economy. This role is reflected in strong economic, cultural, and
other ties with the United States that give the United States a strong interest in the
continued vitality, prosperity, and stability of Hong Kong.").
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maintaining the best possible relations with a valuable United
States trading partner. 2 Denying Matimak Trading Co. access to
federal court because of the lack of formal recognition would be a
senseless veneration of "form" over "substance."
3
II. AN UNFORESEEN DILEMMA
The preeminence of the United States, more than two hun-
dred years after its creation, is a testament to the wisdom of the
men who drafted the document under which it has flourished.
Yet, not even the combined wisdom of all the founding fathers
could address every circumstance the newly formed nation would
face.34 The United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York first examined the unanticipated phenomenon of a
stateless litigant in 1955 in the case of Blair Holdings Corp. v.
Rubinstein." Rubinstein was born a subject of the Czar of Russia
and later acquired Portuguese citizenship; certain actions taken
by Rubinstein, however, caused the court to deem him "stateless"
for purposes of diversity jurisdiction.36 The plaintiff sought to
have his case heard in a federal court and, consequently, the
court addressed the issue of "whether for the purpose of federal
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a)(2) a stateless person is a
citizen or subject of a foreign state.3 7 The court denied Ruben-
32 See Tetra Finance (HK) Ltd., 584 F. Supp at 848. The Tetra court stated, in
dicta, that precluding Hong Kong corporations from suing in the federal courts
would be a hypertechnical distinction which should not be permitted. See id. It
stressed that modern world realities should control and allow certain governmental
entities to sue even though they have not yet been formally recognized as a foreign
state by the executive branch. See id; see also Matimak, 118 F.3d at 91 (Altimari, J.,
dissenting) (citing Tetra, 584 F. Supp. at 848).
See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 91 (Altimari, J., dissenting).
3' See Biancheria, supra note 28, at 209 (explaining how, at the time the Consti-
tution was written, a person being "stateless" was not contemplated).
'- 133 F. Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
36 See id at 499. The court cited the case of Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483,
484 (1879), which advanced the presumption that citizenship, once established, con-
tinues. See id. The court went on to explain that, in Rubinstein's case, the presump-
tion would not stand because of the following. (1) Rubinstein and his entire family
fled Russia in 1918, without permission of the Soviet authorities; (2) Under applica-
ble Soviet statutes and laws relating to the forfeiture of Soviet citizenship, Rubin-
stein ceased to be a citizen of the U.S.S.R.; (3) Rubinstein registered as a stateless
person with the United States Department of Justice. See id. In addition, the pre-
sumption that Rubinstein continued to be a citizen of Portugal was overcome by the
Portuguese Consul General in New York issuing a document certifying that Rubin-
stein's citizenship had been canceled. See id.
37 id.
[Vol. 72:607
MATIMAK TRADING CO. V. KLALILY
stein access to the federal courts, declaring that the terms "ali-
ens" and "foreigners" were plainly intended to refer to "citizens or
subjects of some specific foreign state.",8 Contrary to the appar-
ent plain meaning of the diversity statute, it has been contended
that the Framers' unawareness of the concept of "statelessness"
led them to believe that "they had encompassed all aliens when
speaking of 'citizens or subjects of foreign states.' "" Further,
"constrained adherence to what appears to be plain language dis-
serves the statutory purposes of avoiding entanglements with
foreign sovereigns and offering an impartial judicial forum to the
alien. ' 40
In an attempt to settle such quandaries, Judge Richard A.
Posner, in his work entitled The Federal Courts: Crisis and Re-
form,4 described two methods judges could utilize when at-
tempting to ascertain the manner in which a legislature would
have applied a statute in circumstances not considered during
drafting.42  If the judge is unable to imaginatively reconstruct 4 3
exactly what the legislators would have done, he or she must dis-
cern the interpretation that will provide the most reasonable re-
sult.4 It seems that the most reasonable result in the Matimak
38 Id. at 500.
39 Biancheria, supra note 28, at 210 (emphasis in original) (citing 2 THE
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 492-93 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1866)). "This view is supported by
[the Framersl frequent use of the terms 'citizens or subjects of foreign states' inter-
changeably with 'foreigners' and 'aliens.' "Id. at 210 n.68; see also Van der Schefling
v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 756, 759-60 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (de-
claring that the Framers referring to "citizens," "subjects," and "foreigners" inter-
changeably is an indication that, in their minds, the terms "citizen" and "subject"
were synonymous), affd, 324 F.2d 956 (3d Cir. 1963).
The Judiciary Act of 1789 provides additional evidence of the Framers' intent to
encompass all aliens in the grant of jurisdiction. See Biancheria, supra note 28, at
210-11. For example, the Act initially allowed suit in federal court 'where an alien
is a party' without any apparent qualification." IM at 211. Furthermore, Justice
Story defined an alien as "'any person who is not a citizen of the United States,' "in
his review of the jurisdictional provisions of the Constitution. Id (quoting JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 499 (5th ed.
1891)).
40 Biancheria, supra note 28, at 209.
4' RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985).
42 See id. at 286-87 (describing his two-part approach).
4" See id. (describing the process by which a judge steps into the legislators'
shoes when deciding how to apply a statute).
See id. at 287 (explaining that the judge must always remember that what
seems reasonable to him or her may not have seemed reasonable to the legislators
who enacted the statute, and that the legislators' evaluation of what is reasonable
19981
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case would have been to render an interpretation that permitted
"stateless" Matimak to have its day in federal court. By denying
Matimak access to the federal judiciary, the Second Circuit may
have altered the balance of foreign relations between the United
States and any of the several other remaining British Crown
colonies."5  As a justification for a decision that may damage
United States trade relations,46 the majority offered the proposi-
tion that "It]he same terms used in the same statute should get
the same meaning, 7 and then proceeded to contradict that justi-
fication in the next paragraph.48 Additionally, the Supreme
Court and others have counseled against designating any entity
as "stateless.' 9 While these cases may be distinguished from the
should guide the judge's decision).
45 See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 88 (Altimari, J., dissenting) (referring to Bermuda,
St. Helena, Falkland Islands, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, and Gibral-
tar). See id. (asserting that the majority's holding risks antagonizing both the
United Kingdom and China).
47 Matimak, 118 F.3d at 83.
48 See id. The majority explained that 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4), and the current §
1332(a)(2), were not drafted together. See id. In 1976, after revising § 1332(a)(2),
Congress passed § 1332(a)(4), which created diversity jurisdiction in suits brought
by foreign states against a United States citizen. See id. "Foreign state" in the new §
1332(a)(4) is defined by reference to 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a), which frequently uses the
term without ever defining it. See id. The majority further reasoned that since Con-
gress neglected to define § 1332(a)(2) by a similar reference to Section 1603(a), it
"suggests only that 'foreign state' in § 1332(a)(2) does not include § 1603(a)'s inclu-
sion of certain instrumentalities, political subdivisions and other state entities as a
'foreign state.' " Id. This, according to the majority, does not suggest that the two
should employ different definitions of "foreign state." Id. at 83-84.49 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion). In Trop, a military
deserter for less than a day was convicted of wartime desertion, sentenced to three
years at hard labor, and dishonorably discharged. See id. at 87-88. Trop's application
for a passport in 1952 was denied on the grounds that under the provisions of Sec-
tion 401(g) of the Nationality Act of 1940, 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (a)(8), he had forfeited his
citizenship as a result of his conviction and dishonorable discharge. See id at 88. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to examine the penalty of being branded "state-
less." Id. at 87. After using the death penalty as an "index" of the constitutional limit
on punishment, the Court reversed the lower court's decision. See id. at 99, 104. In
announcing the judgment of the Court, Chief Justice Warren stated:
We believe ... that use of denationalization as a punishment is barred by
the Eighth Amendment. There may be involved no physical mistreatment,
no primitive torture. There is instead the total destruction of the individ-
ual's status in organized society. It is a form of punishment more primitive
than torture, for it destroys for the individual the political existence that
was centuries in the development.... This punishment is offensive to car-
dinal principles for which the Constitution stands. It subjects the individ-
ual to a fate of ever-increasing fear and distress.
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situation in Matimak, it is contended that preventing the unnec-
essary imposition of a "stateless" label on any entity should be a
common thread in each.
III. RETHINKING THE GENERAL RULE
Whether it is construed as allegiance or unquestioning ad-
herence, the majority's affirmance of the general rule under
which formal recognition by the executive branch predominately
determines the existence of a foreign state50 merits examination.
Both the legislative and executive branches were endowed with
parallel powers in the realm of foreign affairs.5 A popular view
of separation of powers in the area of foreign affairs asserts that
the Framers intended the legislature to be preeminent in this
arena. That aim, however, has been obfuscated by realities that
have come to recognize the appointment of the President as the
driving force behind foreign policy.52 Legislative sentiment on the
Id at 101-02; see also Guerrero v. United States, 691 F. Supp. 260, 264 (D.N.
Mariana Islands 1988) (requiring issuance of a passport to a resident of the former
trust territories of the Northern Mariana Islands to prevent the irreparable injury of
being rendered stateless and unable to travel); Biancheria, supra note 28, at 205
(noting that in other contexts, federal courts have adopted a more flexible approach
to citizenship so as to avoid the injustice that would accompany the designation of
an entity as "stateless").
0 See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 80 ("At the very least,... the de facto test depends
heavily on whether the Executive Branch regards the entity as an independent sov-
ereign nation.' ") (quoting Iran Handicraft and Export Ctr. v. Maijan Intl Corp., 655
F. Supp. 1275, 1278 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)).
51 Legislative grants of power include: regulating commerce with foreign nations
and the Indian tribes; defining and punishing piracies and felonies on the high seas
and offenses against the law of nations; declaring war; granting letters of marque
and reprisal; making rules concerning captures on land and water; raising and sup-
porting armies; providing and maintaining a navy;, making rules for the regulation
of land and naval forces; calling forth the militia to execute the laws, suppressing
insurrections and repelling invasions; and providing for organizing, arming, and dis-
ciplining the militia, and for governing those in service to the United States. See
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
Executive grants of power include: serving as commander-in-chief of the armed
forces and of the militia, when in service to the United States; making treaties with
the advice and consent of the Senate; appointing ambassadors, other public minis-
ters, and consuls; receiving ambassadors and other public ministers; and commis-
sioning all officers of the United States. See U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2, 3.
52 See generally LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 89-
123 (1972) (describing conflict and cooperation between the executive and legislative
branches on issues of foreign policy).
[Tihe foreign relations powers appear not so much 'separated' as fis-
sured .... [but] [iun the end and over-all, Congress clearly came first, in the
longest article, expressly conferring many, important powers; the Executive
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humanitarian treatment of Hong Kong and its citizens can be
gleaned from selected portions of the text of the Hong Kong Pol-
icy Act of 1992.53 It must be queried, however, how can basic
human rights be safeguarded if citizens of Hong Kong cannot be
assured access to the most impartial judiciary for the resolution
of legal conflicts? Although Matimak is only one case, in the ag-
gregate, the legislature's objectives will not be served. Hong
Kong's economic vitality will be threatened if legal conflicts in
the state courts are skewed by xenophobia and distrust of foreign
competitors. Moreover, it is contended that the general rule and
ceremony of formal recognition, engendered by happenstance,
prevents the legislature from guaranteeing the achievement of
its objectives.
The landmark decision of Marbury v. Madison,' declared the
Supreme Court to be the ultimate interpreter of the Constitu-
tion.55 There is no conflict between the law and the Constitution
in Matimak since § 1332(a)(2) basically mirrors Article III's ref-
erence to foreign states, citizens or subjects.5 As the final
authority on the Constitution, the Supreme Court has never de-
fined "foreign state," nor directly addressed the issue.5 7 The
Court did announce that recognition of a foreign nation's sover-
eignty is a power that lies exclusively within the province of the
came second, principally as executive-agent of Congressional policy....
Surely, though building magnificently, ... the Framers could not foresee
what the United States would become, what the world would become....
Realities ... modified the theoretical divisions, for in the competition of the
political branches the President has had most of the advantages and Con-
gress has not always been able to maintain its prerogatives.
Id. at 32-35.
The Hong Kong Policy Act, 22 U.S.C. § 5701(6) (1992) noted:
The human rights of the people of Hong Kong are of great importance to
the United States and are directly relevant to United States interests in
Hong Kong. A fully successful transition in the exercise of sovereignty over
Hong Kong must safeguard human rights in and of themselves. Human
rights also serve as a basis for Hong Kong's continued economic prosperity.
Id.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
Id. at 177 ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
to [s]ay what the law is."); see also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) ("[T]he
federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution.").
' Compare U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1, with 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (referring
to jurisdiction over suits between United States citizens and "citizens or subjects" of
foreign states).
See Matimak, 118 F.3d at 79.
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executive branch,58 but a "stateless" label does not necessarily
follow from a failure to provide such recognition. Consequently,
the Court's likely stance on resolving this quandary can best be
inferred by heeding the Court's proscriptions against designating
any entity as "stateless." 9 Therefore, the general rule should be
modernized and reworked to prevent the exclusion of foreign
states by the "deferential" judiciary, when the results could con-
tinue to be at odds with Supreme Court declarations.
The Framers were equally concerned with the potential
weakness of the judicial branch of government as they were with
providing a forum in which the rights of foreigners would be
scrupulously upheld."0 As a coordinate branch of government, the
judiciary is responsible for deciding the " 'supreme Law of the
land' and thus on occasion [must] override legislative or execu-
tive action."6 Consequently, the independence of the judiciary
branch from the executive and legislative branches is the basic
tenet under which our democratic form of government has
thrived.62 History has witnessed several conflicts between the
executive and judiciary branches." One of the most significant
and famous occurred in 1952 when President Truman ordered
the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of and operate
most of the Nation's steel mills." Truman's action "[struck] not
only at the right of a person not 'to be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law,' but at the power of... the
r' See Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 214 (1890) ("All courts of justice are
bound to take judicial notice of the territorial extent of the jurisdiction exercised by
the government whose laws they administer.").
"9 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
60 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 465-66 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin
Fletcher Wright ed., 1961)
[It is] incontestabl[e], that the judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest
of the three departments of power; that it can never attack with success ei-
ther of the other two; and that all possible care is requisite to enable it to
defend itself against their attacks.... There is no liberty, if the power of
judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.
Id. at 491.
6' ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT, THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS AND ITS
PRESENT-DAY SIGNIFICANCE 98 (1953).
See id. at 97-98
"See id. at 124-28 (discussing various occurrences of tension between the ex-
ecutive and judicial branches). For a broader discussion of how the executive and
legislative powers interact, see LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS
BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT (3d ed. 1991).
6See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582 (1952).
19981
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
courts to adjudicate with respect to such rights."65 In his concur-
ring opinion in the case of Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Authority,66 Justice Brandeis described seven self-imposed mani-
festations of judicial deference that have developed in the Su-
preme Court. 7 In light of the threat to valued trade relations
and to the essential balance of power between the coordinate
branches of government, "[tihe time [has surely] come for a re-
consideration of the propriety of the entire doctrine of judicial
deference, if the balance contemplated by the Constitution is to
be recovered."'
Although the People's Republic of China resumed sover-
eignty over Hong Kong on July 1, 1997,69 future availability of the
federal courts to Hong Kong citizens is a question that has not
been specifically addressed.7" Although the Second Circuit lim-
ited its denial of alienage jurisdiction to cases arising prior to the
Chinese resumption of sovereignty over Hong Kong, the court
neglected to provide any guidance on how the change in Hong
Kong's political status would affect its citizens' access to the
United States federal judiciary.7' The Basic Law of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of
China, which took effect on July 1, 1997, described Hong Kong as
65 VANDERBILT, supra note 61, at 126 (quoting the U.S. CONST. amend. V.).
6 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
6 See id. at 346-48 (Brandeis, J., concurring)
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a
friendly, non-adversary, proceeding...
2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance
of the necessity of deciding it.'...
3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is
required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.'...
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question... if there is also
present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of....
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of
one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation....
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the in-
stance of one who has availed himself of its benefits....
7. 'When the validity of an act.., is drawn in question, and even if a seri-
ous doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this
Court will first ascertain whether a construction ... is fairly possible by
which the question may be avoided.'...
Id. (citations omitted).
8 VANDERBILT, supra note 61, at 139.
See 22 U.S.C.A. § 5701(1)(A).
70 See Matimak Trading Co. v. Khalily, 118 F.3d 76, 80 n.1 (2d Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 883 (1998).
71 See id.
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an "inalienable part" of China.12 Tam Wing-Pong, Hong Kong's
acting Secretary for Trade and Industry, contended that with
this designation, "there should be no problem for local companies
if cases went to US courts to settle disputes occurring since the
handover."" Moreover, should another Hong Kong corporation
seek access to the federal courts, granting alienage jurisdiction
could only serve to ameliorate presently strained relations be-
tween China and the United States. Yet, despite Chinese af-
firmations of sovereignty, the question will remain unanswered
until a United States federal court rules on whether Article 12 of
the Basic Law 4 is an expression of Chinese sovereignty over
Hong Kong, thereby granting alienage jurisdiction to corpora-
tions like Matimak, as subjects of China-a foreign state that is
officially recognized by the United States. 5
CONCLUSION
The history of the United States is filled with examples of
our government committing troops to conflicts in order to prevent
oppression and spread democracy. Neither public disapproval
nor the imminent loss of countless lives could dissuade our lead-
ers from protecting the nation's interests and safeguarding the
human rights of those often unable to protect themselves. Why
then, when it would require such minimal effort, would the gov-
ernment not act in a similar fashion to do everything possible to
72 See Charlotte Ku, Introductory Note to PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: THE
BASIC LAW OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 29 I.L.M. 1511-12 (1990) [hereinafter BASIC LAW].
Provisions of the Basic Law will serve as a 'mini-constitution' in governing
the relationship between the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
(SAR) and the government of the People's Republic of China.... The Basic
Law, which has been distributed in both Chinese and English by the Con-
sultative Committee in Hong Kong, is an act of the National People's Con-
gress. It is organized into 160 articles with three annexes. The annexes
single out for special treatment some of the most hotly-debated drafting is-
sues [including] how much of the law of the People's Republic would apply
to the Hong Kong SAR.... The drafting objectives of the Basic Law
were.., to ensure the return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty...
Id.
Mark Sharp, Uncertainty Over Legal Rights of 'Stateless' Companies with US
Partners, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 8, 1998, 1998 WL 2969071.
7 See BASIC LAW, supra note 72, at chp. 2, art. 12 (designating the Hong Kong
SAR as a local administrative region of the People's Republic of China).
75 See 2D Circuit Bars Suits by 'Offshore' Corporations, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 25,
1997, at B9.
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guarantee the just resolution of legal disputes with potential
ramifications for the entire nation? By denying alienage jurisdic-
tion to the Matimak Trading Co., the Second Circuit violated the
intentions of the Framers, who created alienage jurisdiction, and
gambled with an important portion of the United States' trade
balance. Furthermore, it justified its decision by conforming to
the deleterious practice of judicial deference. In doing so, the
court perpetuates a trend that threatens the delicate balance of
power upon which our nation rests.
Michael Alessi
